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RECENT CASES

RCW 28.24.060 EREm. Surp. 1945 § 4719-1] which permitted all students of public or
private schools to use the ".... transportation facilities provided by the school district
in which they reside." Although the U.S. Supreme Court had already found such
statutes not violative of the Federal Constitution, Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1 (1947), Justice Steinert, speaking for the majority and denying the writ, noted
that the Washington Constitution is stricter than the Federal Constitution, and that
Art. I § 11 and Art. IX § 4 of the Washington Constitution presented a "clear denial
of the rights asserted." A determination of the constitutionality of released time plans
in Washington schools would require separate consideration of precisely what constitutes "sectarian influence" within the prohibition of Art. IX § 4. The Visser opinion
dealt with the question of what constitutes support of an admittedly sectarian school,
and therefore offers no help here.
However, Art. IX § 2 ("... But the entire revenue derived from the common
school fund and the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the
support of the common schools") has provided additional support for the decisions
denying transportation rights to students of religious schools, but would have no application to a provision like the one in the Zorach case involving only the question of
released time.
In any event, the rule thus far is merely that the Zorach type program does not
violate the Federal Constitution. The Washington Constitution could present another
hurdle for the local advocates of this type of religious training.
RAYmoND H. SinEnus

Taxation-Prizes for Artistic or Scholastic Accomplishments-Gifts or Income?
P won $25,000 for the best symphony entered in a contest sponsored by a philanthropist. P composed his symphony during a three year period, 1936 to 1939, entered
the contest and won the prize in 1947. The sponsor of the award derived no profit
from the contest nor from P's participation in it. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue ruled that the entire award was taxable as income and under I.R.C. § 107(b),
to be computed as though the award had been ratably received over the three year
period ending with 1947. P filed a claim for refund on the ground that the prize constituted a gift under I.R.C. § 22(b) (3) which excludes gift from gross income as
defined under I.R.C. § 22(a). The district court held that it was a gift. Robertson
v .U.S., 93 F. Supp. 660 (D. Utah 1950). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the award was taxable as income. U.S. v. Robertson, 190 F. 2d 680 (C.A. 10th
1951). Certiorari granted because of a conflict between this case and McDermott v.
Commissioner, 150 F. 2d 585 (App. D.C. 1945). Held: Affirmed. Acceptance by
contestants of the offer tendered by the sponsor of a prize contest creates an enforceable
contract. Payment of the prize offered to the winner, of the contest is the discharge
of a contractual obligation and therefore not excludable from gross income as
property received as a gift. Robertson v. U.S., 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
The taxability of a prize is determined by Sections 22(a) and 22(b) (3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Section 22(a) provides, "Gross income includes gaifis, profits
and income derived from salaries, wages or compensation for personal service . . .
of whatever kind and in whatever form paid. . . ." Section 22(b) provides, "The
following items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from
taxation under this chapter: ... (3) ... The value of property acquired by gift .....
If the award is compensation for personal services, it is taxable; if it is a gift,
it is exempt.
This is the first ruling of the Supreme Court in this area. The broad doctrine
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announced by this decision, while adequate for the disposition of the case presented
to the court, does not greatly clarify the confusion which has existed in this narrow
field. The reason for this confusion is more easily understood when it is noted that
in this class of cases, from the viewpoint of the sponsor, who receives no legal benefit,
the money is a gift, made with full donative intent. However, the winner has actually
received something of value as the result of the performance of personal services:
the writing of the essay or the composition of the symphony for the prize. Thus
it seems that the prize money may be held taxable or non-taxable, depending upon
whether it is viewed from the standpoint of the donor or from that of the recipient.
In McDermott v. Commissioner, supra, the petitioner was awarded $3000 for the
best essay submitted in a contest annually sponsored by the American Bar Association.
The Court of Appeals held the prize money to be a gift and non-taxable. The court
strongly emphasized the sponsor's donative intention and the recipient's non-pecuniary
motivation as being the most important if not the controlling factors in reaching its
decision. At least one subsequent case has followed this holding. Amirikian v. U.S.,
100 F. Supp. 263 (D. Md. 1951).
On the other hand, the Tax Court has been placing less emphasis on these factors,
but rather, expressing the view that the controlling issue is whether as to the recipient,
this award was gain or compensation from labor or work at a business or profession,
i.e. an exchange of services or its product for money. Herbert Stein, 14 T.C. 494
(1950). The Tax Court has adhered to the view expressed by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. The Bureau has declared that the winners of the Ross Essay Prize for
1949 and future years will be held to have received taxable income. I.T. 3960, 1949-2
Cum.BULL. 13; I.T. 3987, 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 9.
The dotrcine enunciated in the principal case is more in keeping with the policy
of the Tax Court decisions and an implied repudiation of the rationale of the McDermott
case. The Supreme Court expressly declares that

".

. . where a payment is in return

for services rendered, its character as taxable income is unaffected by the fact that
the person making it derives no economic benefit therefrom."
The decision in the principal case would not seem to alter the law with respect to
scholarship grants or awards such as Nobel Prizes and Rhodes Scholarships which
have long been held not taxable, though necessarily made on a competitive basis.
G.C.M. 5881, VIII-1 Cum. BULL. 68 (1929). The Supreme Court in the instant case
clearly points out that the case would be different if this were an award made in
recognition of past achievements or present abilities, or out of affection, respect,
admiration, charity or similar impulses. An element common to the principal case and
the above situations is that the composition of the symphony was accomplished long
before the recipient had knowledge that such award would be made. However, in
the Robertson case the recipient exchanged the product of his services for the prize,
which would seem to distinguish it from the scholarship cases in which the donee
performs no services, but is given the grant in recognition of past or present abilities.
The majority of the prize cases are to be found in situations involving radio quiz
shows, newspaper and puzzle contests, and lotteries. In these cases the recipient has
performed services or given consideration. The winnings have consistently been held
to be taxable income. Droge v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937) (Irish Sweepstakes) ; I.T. 1651, 11-1 Cum. BULL. 54 (1923) ; I.T. 1667, 11-1 Cum. BULL. 83 (1923).
There can be little doubt as to the existence of a contract in such a situation.
An analogous though distinguishable fact pattern was presented in Pauline C.
Washburn, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945). The Tax Court there held that $900 received by the
petitioner from the Pot 0' Gold Radio Program was not taxable income. The money
was paid for merely answering the telephone, the number being selected by chance.
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It does not seem that the rationale of this decision conflicts with the holding in the
principal case. It would require a very definite extension of orthodox contract
principles in order to find a contract under such circumstances. Perhaps it could be
said that picking up the telephone and answering it would be sufficient consideration
to support the sponsor's offer to pay a given amount to the person who so answers,
but a bar to the formation of a contract would be the fundamental principle of contract
law that an act done without knowledge of an offer cannot be an acceptance thereof.
RESTATEMENT, CoNmAcTs § 53 (1932).
In the Robertson case the court was not faced with the issue and therefore, unfortunately, did not provide any clearly defined guide as to the answer when the payment
of the award is not the discharge of a contractual obligation. It is submitted that,
although the Supreme Court in its summary disposition of the factual situation
presented by the principal case has provided a guide to some of the more troublesome
situations upon which the Bureau and the lower courts have been in general disagreeLment, an equal number of problems remain open for further judicial determination,
with the Robertson opinion giving little or no aid to the Supreme Court should it be
called upon to settle future controvbrsies in this narrow but confusing area of the law.
NEWMAN L. DoTsoN

Corporations-Right of Director to Inspect Corporate Books. P, as a director and
stockholder of a corporation, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the corporation's
officers to make available for inspection by P certain corporate books and records.
The court found that P's purposes in seeking inspection of the records were hostile
to the corporation and if consummated would be inimical to the best interests of the
corporation. The trial court dismissed P's petition. Held: Affirmed. State ex rel.
Paschall v. Scott, 141 Wash. Dec. 62, 247 P.2d 543 (1952).
This case is the first Washington ruling upon the question of whether the right
of a director of a corporation to inspect and examine the corporate books and records
is absolute, or whether it is qualified and may be denied upon proof of a purpose which
is hostile and adverse to the best interests of the corporation. Washington adopts the
view that the director's right of inspection is qalified rather than absolute, a minority
position.
Two statutes have a bearing on this question: first, "The business of every corporation shall be managed by a board of at least three directors. . . :'RCW 23,36.010
[REM. Supp. 1943 § 3803-31] ; second, "Officers and directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation, and must discharge the duties of their respective positions in
good faith....." RCW 23.36.080 [RRS § 3803-33] (italics added). It is axiomatic that
if the directors are to manage the affairs of a corporation they must have access to the corporate records to carry out that function. However, the statute commands that the
director must discharge the duties of his position in good faith. Thus, the court reasoned
that the director's right of inspection is an incident of the duties imposed by statute,
discharge of which must be in good faith. When the director's good faith disappears he
can no longer assert that he is carrying out his duties, hence the right of inspection
can no longer be claimed.
The majority rule, clearly rejected by the Washington court, confers upon the director an absolute right of inspection. The right will not be denied, even upon the showing
of motives adverse to the interests of the corporation. The following cases are in accord
with the majority view: Lavin v. J. C. Lavin Co., Inc., 264 App. Div. 205, 34 N.Y.S.

